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We introduce a robust scheme for long-distance continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-
independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) in which we employ post-selection between
distant parties communicating through the medium of an untrusted relay. We perform a security
analysis that allows for general transmissivity and thermal noise variance of each link, in which we
assume an eavesdropper performs a collective attack and controls the excess thermal noise in the
channels. The introduction of post-selection enables the parties to sustain a secret key rate over
distances exceeding those of existing CV-MDI protocols. In the worst-case scenario in which the
relay is positioned equidistant between them, we find that the parties may communicate securely
over a range of 14 km in standard optical fiber. Our protocol helps to overcome the rate-distance
limitations of previously proposed CV-MDI protocols while maintaining many of their advantages.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the promise of provably secure communication
built on the laws of physics, Quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1, 2] is one of the most important results emerg-
ing from the field of quantum information theory [3, 4].
QKD allows two parties, conventionally named Alice and
Bob, to generate a secret key by communicating via an
untrusted quantum channel. An eavesdropper (Eve) may
employ the most robust attack allowed by the laws of
physics, however, she is always restricted by the inherent
uncertainty of quantum mechanics and is forced to avoid
over-tampering with the signal as doing so will reveal
her presence to the parties. By combining the attained
secret key from a QKD protocol with the one-time pad
algorithm, fully secure communication between the par-
ties is guaranteed.
In recent years the field of QKD has evolved rapidly
from the primitive BB84 protocol [5] to current state-
of-the-art provably secure protocols allowing parties to
communicate over hundreds of kilometers [6–8]. Fur-
thermore, there exists a large body of work based on
proof-of-principle experiments and in-field tests, includ-
ing ground-to-satellite communications [9–11]. Most of
the aforementioned work has focused on discrete variable
(DV) protocols. Continuous variable (CV) protocols are
a promising alternative that make use of readily avail-
able, inexpensive, and easily implementable equipment.
CV protocols have been demonstrated to be capable of
secret key rates close to the ultimate repeaterless (PLOB)
bound [12], which corresponds to the secret key capacity
of the lossy channel. Many protocols have been proven
secure and others have been demonstrated in a proof-
of-concept experiment [13] and field tests [14, 15]. Re-
cently, experimental results for long-distance CV-QKD
over 202.81km of ultra low-loss optical fiber have been
achieved [16].
Many recent QKD protocols have focused on an end-
to-end as opposed to point-to-point approach in which
Alice and Bob communicate via remote relays. In-
troducing a single relay allows the parties to perform
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocols,
even if the relay is untrusted [17–21]. Measurement de-
vice independence removes the security threat of side-
channel attacks attempted by Eve. Several MDI-inspired
protocols have been devised that can achieve high rates
and exceed the PLOB bound. The first of these protocols
was the seminal twin-field protocol [23–25], followed by
the phase-matching protocol [26, 27] and the sending-or-
not-sending protocol [28–31]. See Fig. 11 of Ref. [1] for a
summary of their performances.
In 2013, a CV-MDI protocol was proposed and demon-
strated in a proof-of-concept experiment to achieve very
high secret key rates over relatively short distances [32]
(see also Refs. [33–35] for other studies). Unfortunately,
developing a protocol that allows exploitation of the prac-
ticality of the CV-MDI regime at long distance is a dif-
ficult problem in recent QKD theory [36–39]. A lot of
effort has been directed at improving the performance
of this type of protocol, with proposals based on vir-
tual photon subtraction [40, 41], unidimensional modula-
tion [42], or discrete modulation [43]. While these proto-
cols offered an improvement in the range of the asymmet-
ric configuration; in which the relay is positioned within
close range of one of the parties; their applicability in the
symmetric configuration, in which the relay is positioned
equidistance between the parties, was very limited. Only
Refs. [40, 41] offered any improvement over the original
CV-MDI protocol in the symmetric configuration.
In this work, we begin to bridge the rate-distance gap
between DV- and CV-MDI protocols. In particular, we
aim to improve the distance over which a rate is attain-
able in the symmetric configuration. In this case, a secret
key rate under the original CV-MDI protocol and ideal
conditions is only attainable at very short distances cor-
responding to a 0.75 dB loss [33]. In order to extend this
range, we employ a post-selection (PS) regime. PS de-
scribes the ability of the parties to select only instances
of the protocol in which they have an advantage over
the eavesdropper, given a prescriptive map of the contri-
2bution of the possible signals. By discarding any other
instances, the secret key rate is always positive, and the
parties can communicate securely up to a distance at
which the key rate drops below a minimum usability
threshold.
Post selection of a CV protocol was first introduced
by Silberhorn et al. [44] where it allowed a secret key to
be constructed for losses exceeding the previous limit of
3 dB. Later, the technique was generalized to thermal
loss channels [45, 46] and the concept has been demon-
strated in the experimental settings [47, 48]. In this work,
for the first time, we consider the post-selection of an
MDI protocol which includes a measurement at an un-
trusted relay. We perform post-selection over the relay
measurement outcome as well as Alice and Bob’s vari-
ables while assuming that Eve employs a collective attack
in which she targets both the Alice-relay and Bob-relay
links.
The paper is structured as follows: we begin by outlin-
ing the protocol in detail and follow the evolution of the
modes. We then derive the mutual information between
the parties and the Holevo bound in order to quantify
Eve’s information. Using these quantities we are able to
build the single-point rate, which serves as a prescriptive
map for the parties to select the advantageous channel
uses. Finally, we calculate the post selected secret key
rate of the protocol.
II. THE PROTOCOL
Let us begin our analysis by outlining our protocol
which is shown schematically in Fig. 1. The secure parties
that we label Alice and Bob are each connected to a relay
with fiber optic links. We assume that both parties have
access to a general Gaussian distribution of the form
p(x, σ) =
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ
)
. (1)
In each use of the protocol, Alice draws two random
numbers qA and pA from her Gaussian distribution with
variance σA. From these two numbers, she extracts ab-
solute values |qA| = A and |pA| = A′ and signs κ and
κ′, respectively. For both κ and κ′, she records bit val-
ues 0(1) if the sign is positive(negative). She proceeds to
prepare a coherent state of the form
∣∣1
2 (κA+iκ
′
A
′)
〉
and
sends it the relay via a quantum channel. Bob follows a
similar procedure, generating two random numbers qB
and pB using his Gaussian distribution with a generally
different variance σB . He generates a state of the form∣∣ 1
2 (κ˜B+i κ˜
′
B
′)
〉
and sends it to the relay.
After quantum communication ceases, the parties per-
form basis reconciliation. If the q-quadrature is chosen,
the variables κ′ and κ˜′ are ignored. Alice publicly broad-
casts A and pA while Bob broadcasts B and pB and at-
tempts to reconcile his variable κ˜ with Alice’s variable κ.
Alternatively, if the p-quadrature is chosen, the relevant
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the protocol assuming the q-quadrature
is chosen by the parties for reconciliation. (a): Alice and Bob
send their coherent states to the relay. Eve is in possession of
two two-mode squeezed vacuum states, denoted by white cir-
cles. She employs dual entangling cloner attacks, interacting
with Alice and Bob’s modes beam splitters of transmissivity
τA and τB, respectively. The output modes A
′ and B′ are
mixed in the balanced beam splitter at the relay and the new
output modes A′′ and B′′ are subsequently measured with ho-
modyne p- and q-detection with corresponding outcomes γp
and γq, respectively that are publicly announced. After quan-
tum communication ceases, Alice broadcasts A and pA while
Bob broadcasts B and pB . (b): In the restricted eavesdrop-
ping scenario Bob’s action is modeled in the entanglement-
based representation. He measures, with heterodyne detec-
tion, one mode b of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state of
variance µ obtaining the outcome (κ˜B, pB). This action pre-
pares coherent states in the conjugate mode B that is subse-
quently sent to the relay.
variables become κ′ and κ˜′. Alice broadcasts A′ and qA
while Bob broadcasts B′ and qB.
We assume that Eve employs dual entangling cloner
attacks in which she inserts beam splitters of transmis-
sivity τA and τB into lossless Alice-relay and Bob-relay
channels, respectively. She uses the beam splitters to mix
Alice’s mode A with her mode E1 and Bob’s mode B with
her mode E2. The modes E1 and E2 each form one half of
independent two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) states
with conjugate modes e1 and e2, and variances ωA and
ωB, respectively. She stores the outputs from one port
of each beam splitter in a quantum memory and sends
the remaining outputs A′ and B′ to the relay where they
are mixed in a balanced beam splitter with outputs A′′
and B′′ that are subsequently measured with homodyne
detection in the p- and q- quadratures, respectively. The
corresponding outcomes γp and γq are publicly broadcast
as γ = (γq, γp).
To model detector inefficiencies, we can treat the
modes A′′ and B′′ as passing through beam splitters of
transmissivity η where they are each mixed with one half
of separate TMSV states with identical variance S before
arriving at 100% efficient homodyne detectors. We may
assume that the noise of the detectors is untrusted, in
which case we assume the TMSV states are part of Eve’s
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FIG. 2: Models of inefficiency in homodyne detection at the relay using beam splitters. (a) depicts a trusted noise scenario in
which it is assumed that Eve does not have access to the output of the beam splitters. (b) assumes that the outputs of the
beam splitters are added to Eve’s quantum memory for later measurement. (c) depicts a simplification in the symmetric case
(τA = τB = τ ) and with S = 0 in which the transmissivities of the Alice-relay and Bob-relay links are scaled by a factor of η
to model the effect of beam splitters at detectors.
state and are included in the calculation of Eve’s infor-
mation, or trusted, in which case they are discarded. If
S = 1, and τA = τB = τ , the detector inefficiencies
can be modeled without considering beam splitter inter-
actions at the relay by absorbing the detector efficiency
parameter into the transmissivities of the links such that
τ → ητ . We outline each model schematically in Fig. 2.
In this paper, our goal is to establish the post-selected
asymptotic key rate of the protocol, RPS. However, our
initial objective is to obtain a formula for the standard
asymptotic secret key rate R which is given by the differ-
ence in the reconcilable information between the trusted
parties, βIAB where β is the reconciliation efficiency and
IAB is the mutual information between the parties, and
the Holevo bound χ which quantifies the maximum in-
formation Eve may attain about the secret variable de-
pending on the particular attack,
R = βIAB − χ. (2)
To this end, we follow the propagation of the covariance
matrix (CM) of the total Alice-Bob-Eve system and its
associated mean value. As each use of the protocol is
Gaussian, these are the only tools we need to compute
the probabilities and states needed to derive the key rate.
After this step is complete, we explain the post-selection
procedure which allows us to extend the range of the
protocol.
The initial covariance matrix (CM) of the total system
is given by
VAB E |κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ ABA′ B′ = IA ⊕ IB ⊕VE (3)
where VE is Eve’s initial CM, which, assuming she con-
trols the detector noise at the relay, is given by
VE =VTMSV(ωA)⊕VTMSV(ωB)
⊕VTMSV(S)⊕VTMSV(S) (4)
with VTMSV(µ) being the CM of a TMSV state with
variance µ given by
VTMSV(µ) =
(
µI
√
µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z µI
)
(5)
where Z = diag(1,−1) and I is the 2×2 identity matrix.
The mean value of the combined system of Alice and Bob
is given by
x¯AB|κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ ABA′ B′ = (κA, κ
′
A
′, κ˜B, κ˜′ B′)T (6)
while the mean value of Eve’s system can be taken
initial as zero. The action of all of the beam split-
ters can be encapsulated by a unitary operator Tˆ
that, when applied to the system, gives the post-
propagation CM VA′′B′′E′|κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ ABA′ B′ and mean value
x¯A′′B′′E′|κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ ABA′ B′ . Eve’s CM with conditioning on
γ is obtained by performing the homodyne measurements
at the relay on the modes A′′ and B′′ in the p- and q-
quadrature, respectively. The measurement outcome in
the q-quadrature, γq with conditioning on the measure-
ment outcome of the p-quadrature, γp, is given by
p(γq|κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ABA′ B′ γp) = 1√
2πυ
×
× exp
[
− 1
2υ
(
γ +
√
η
2
(κA
√
τA − κ˜B√τB)
)2]
(7)
and in the reverse case we have
p(γp|κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ABA′ B′ γq) = 1√
2πυ
×
× exp
[
− 1
2υ
(
γ −
√
η
2
(κA
√
τA + κ˜B
√
τB)
)2]
(8)
where
υ = (1−η)S+ η
2
[τA+τB+(1−τA)ωA+(1−τB)ωB]. (9)
Note that the two quadratures are independent, we have
p(γq|κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ABA′ B′ γp) = p(γq|κ κ˜AB) (10)
p(γp|κ κ˜ κ′ κ˜′ABA′ B′ γq) = p(γp|κ′ κ˜′A′ B′). (11)
This fact allows us to simplify our calculation of the rate
by only considering one quadrature. The quadrature of
importance is that which is chosen by Alice and Bob in
4the quadrature reconciliation step as it, at this point, be-
comes the quadrature that contains the relevant encoding
variable. However, the rate is independent of this choice
of quadrature. We will therefore arbitrarily choose the
q-quadrature for our forthcoming calculation of the rate
and we will employ the refined notation γ ≡ γq while
ignoring the variables κ′, κ˜′, A′ and B′.
A. Restricted eavesdropping
Broadcasting (B, pB) or (qB ,B
′) ensures that post-
selection can be performed successfully, however it may
be possible for Bob to communicate all of the necessary
information to Alice using a smaller subset of information
released after many uses of the protocol. This strategy
may achieve a better rate by reducing Eve’s information
relative to the case in which Bob’s information is broad-
cast in every use. We can establish a lower bound on
this rate by considering a protocol in which Eve may not
access any information broadcast by Bob. To establish
Eve’s state in this restricted-eavesdropping scenario, we
need to consider an entanglement-based version of the
protocol as shown in Fig. 1(b). Bob’s action may be
modeled as measuring one mode of a TMSV state with
modulation µ. The amplitude of the coherent states |β˜〉
remotely prepared as a result of this process is related to
the measurement outcome β by
β˜ = ξβ∗, ξ =
√
µ+ 1
µ− 1 (12)
We label Bob’s heterodyne measurement outcome as
(κ˜B, κ˜′ B′).
For our analysis, we again consider only the q-
quadrature using the fact that the quadratures are un-
correlated. After applying the beam splitter operation
to the CM and mean value, we obtain the relay measure-
ment outcome γ ≡ γq with probability
p(γ|κA) = 1√
2πυ˜
exp

− 1
2υ˜
(
γ + κA
√
1
2
ητA
)2
(13)
where
υ˜ = (1−η)S+ η
2
[τA + τBµ+ (1 − τA)ωA + (1− τB)ωB] .
(14)
After the relay measurements, the CM and mean value
of the remaining system become VbE′|κA γ and x¯bE′|κAγ .
Eve’s CM and mean value are obtained by tracing out
Bob’s remaining mode b. In the final step, Bob performs
a heterodyne measurement on his retained mode. The
associated probability distribution p(κ˜B, pB|κA γ) and
by integrating over pB we obtain
p(κ˜B |κA γ) = 1√
2πVb
×
exp

− 1
2Vb

κ˜B−
√
(µ2 − 1)ητB
2
(
γ+κA
√
1
2ητA
)
υ


2

(15)
where
Vb = (µ+ 1)
(
1− µ− 1
υ
ητB
2
)
. (16)
In the following sections, we will derive the secret key rate
of the protocol for both eavesdropping scenarios based on
the secret encoding variable κ and Bob’s variable κ˜. We
first compute the mutual information then the Holevo
bound and, finally, we will introduce the post-selection
procedure and calculate the post-selected rate.
III. MUTUAL INFORMATION
The first step in the calculations of the secret key rate
is to establish the mutual information between Alice and
Bob using the protocol outputs. The mutual informa-
tion formula is given, independent of the eavesdropping
strategy, by
I(κ : κ˜ |AB γ) = H(κ|AB γ)−H(κ| κ˜AB γ), (17)
where H(X |x) := ∫ p(x)HX|x dx is the conditional en-
tropy. The first term of the mutual information is given
by
H(κ|AB γ) =
∫
p(AB γ)Hκ|AB γ dA dB d γ (18)
while the second may be expressed as
H(κ| κ˜AB γ) =∫
p(AB γ)
∑
κ˜
p(κ˜ |AB γ)Hκ| κ˜AB γ dA dB d γ, (19)
where Hκ|AB γ and Hκ| κ˜AB γ reduce to the binary
entropy of respective probabilities p(κ|AB γ) and
p(κ| κ˜AB γ). We can derive the later probability as
p(κ| κ˜AB γ) = p(γ |κ κ˜AB)p(κ| κ˜AB)∑
κ p(γ |κ κ˜AB)p(κ| κ˜AB)
=
1
1 + exp
[
2κA
√
1
2ητA
(
γ − κ˜B
√
1
2ητB
)
υ−1
]
(20)
5where we have used the fact that κ, κ˜, A and B are
independent variables. Using the same logic, we derive
p( κ˜ |κAB γ) =
1
1 + exp
[
−2 κ˜B
√
1
2ητB
(
γ + κA
√
1
2ητA
)
υ−1
] .
(21)
We also require the probabilities of each of κ and κ˜ with
conditioning on A, B and γ only. We have
p(κ|AB γ) =
∑
κ˜ p(γ |κ κ˜AB)p(κ κ˜ |AB)∑
κ,κ˜ p(γ |κ κ˜AB)p(κ κ˜ |AB)
=
1
1 +
(
p(+|1AB γ)
p(−|0AB γ)
)κ
exp
[
2κ
√
1
2η(B
√
τB + A
√
τA)υ−1
] ,
(22)
where we note that p(κ κ˜ |AB) = 1/4 for all combinations
of κ and κ˜ due to the independence of the variables. Us-
ing the same logic we obtain the remaining probability
required for the calculation of the conditional entropies,
p(κ˜ |AB γ) = (23)
1
1 +
(
p(0|−AB γ)
p(1|+AB γ)
)κ˜
exp
[
−2 κ˜
√
1
2η(B
√
τB + A
√
τA)υ−1
] .
(24)
The final probability we require is the total probability
of all of the post-selection variables which is given by
p(AB γ) =
∑
κ,κ˜
p(γ |κ κ˜AB)p(κA)p(κ˜B). (25)
The probabilities for the computation of the mutual
information in the restricted eavesdropping scenario are
slightly more complicated due to Bob’s TMSV state,
however, the first conditional probability is easily attain-
able as
p(κ˜ |κAB γ) = p(κ˜B |κA γ)∑
p(κ˜B |κA γ)
=
1
1 + exp
[
−2 κ˜B
(
γ+κA
√
1
2ητA
)
∆ υ˜′−1
] (26)
where we have defined
υ˜′ = (1− η)S + η
2
[τA + τB + ωA(1− τA) + ωB(1 − τB)]
(27)
and
∆ =
√
η
2
1
τB
√
µ− 1
µ+ 1
. (28)
In order to calculate the reverse probability p(κ| κ˜AB γ),
we first compute
p(κ|A γ) = p(γ|κA)∑
κ p(γ|κA)
(29)
=
1
1 + exp
(
2κA γ
√
1
2ητAυ˜
−1
) (30)
then the required probability can be derived as
p(κ| κ˜AB γ) = p(κ˜B |κA γ)p(κ|A γ)∑
κ p(κ˜B |κA γ)p(κ|A γ)
=
1
1 + exp
[
2κA
√
1
2ητA (γ
′ − κ˜B∆) υ˜′−1
] (31)
where we have defined
γ′ =
1
υ˜
(
υ˜′ +
η
2
1
τB
(µ− 1)
)
γ (32)
We can now compute the total probabilities of κ and
κ˜ as
p(κ|AB γ) =
∑
κ˜ p(κ˜B |κA γ)p(κ|A γ)∑
κ,κ˜ p(κ˜B |κA γ)p(κ|A γ)
=
1
1 + Ξκ exp
[
2κA
√
1
2ητA (γ
′ + B∆) υ˜′−1
] (33)
with
Ξκ =
(
p(−|1AB γ)
p(−|0AB γ)
)κ
(34)
and
p(κ˜ |AB γ) = (35)
1
1 + Ξκ˜ exp
[
−2 κ˜B
(
γ−A
√
1
2ητA
)
∆ υ˜′−1
] (36)
with
Ξκ˜ =
(
p(1|+ AB γ)
p(1| − AB γ)
)κ˜
. (37)
Finally, the total probability of the three post-selection
variables becomes
p(AB γ) =
∑
κ,κ˜
p(κ˜B |κA γ)p(γ|κA)p(κA). (38)
IV. HOLEVO BOUND
In our consideration of Eve’s accessible information on
the secret variable, we use the Holevo bound, which quan-
tifies the maximum amount of information Eve may at-
tain using any strategy permitted by the laws of quantum
mechanics. We may write the bound as
χ(E′ : κ|AB γ) = S(E′|AB γ)− S(E′|κAB γ) (39)
where S(X |x) := ∫ p(x)S(ρˆX|x) dx is the conditional von
Neumann entropy (VNE) of system X on variable x with
corresponding probability distribution p(x), and S(ρˆ) is
the von Neumann entropy of state ρˆ, defined as
S(ρˆ) = −
∑
i
λi log2 λi. (40)
6where the λi are the eigenvalues of ρˆ.
The first term of the Holevo bound can be written as
S(E′|AB γ) =
∫
p(AB γ)S(ρˆE′|AB γ) dA dB d γ (41)
where ρˆE′|AB γ is Eve’s total state, which can be derived
from the output state of the protocol as
ρˆE′|AB γ =
∑
κ,κ˜
p(κ κ˜ |AB γ)ρˆE′|κA κ˜B γ . (42)
Similarly, the second (conditional) term is given by
S(E′|κAB γ) =∫
p(AB γ)
∑
κ
p(κ|AB γ)S (ρˆE′|κAB γ) dA dB d γ
(43)
where ρˆE′|κAB γ is Eve’s conditional state given by
ρˆE′|κAB γ =
∑
κ˜
p(κ˜ |κAB γ)ρˆE′|κ κ˜AB γ . (44)
Clearly, neither the total nor the condition states are
Gaussian, and computing their entropy directly in the
Fock basis is a difficult problem. Instead, we follow a
method originating from Refs [45, 46] for one-way proto-
cols with coherent states, and with little added complex-
ity we derive the equivalent method for the MDI protocol
with coherent states.
Let us first note that Eve’s state emerging from the
protocol is pure and can be written in the shorthand
notation
ρˆE′|κ κ˜AB γ = Eˆ
′AB γ
κ κ˜ =
∣∣∣E′AB γκ κ˜ 〉〈E′AB γκ κ˜ ∣∣∣ (45)
For convenience we also introduce the shorthand notation
pAB γκ κ˜ ≡ p(κ κ˜ |AB γ) (46)
& pAB γκ˜ |κ ≡ p(κ˜ |κAB γ). (47)
Using the broadcast values A, pA, B, pB and γ, Eve
knows that her total state is a convex combination of the
four states
∣∣∣E′AB γ0+ 〉,∣∣∣E′AB γ0− 〉,∣∣∣E′AB γ1+ 〉 and ∣∣∣E′AB γ1− 〉 and
her state can be expressed in a four-dimensional space.
Note that in our notation we use Alice’s assigned bit val-
ues 0(1) to represent κ = +(−) for aide distinguishability
between κ and κ˜).
Let us re-write the total state in Eq. (42) as
ρˆE′|AB γ =
∑
κ,κ˜
pAB γκ κ˜
∣∣∣E′AB γκ κ˜ 〉〈E′AB γκ κ˜ ∣∣∣ . (48)
To examine the information held by Eve in her state we
can compute the matrix of all overlaps S, whose elements
Sij are given by the overlaps
〈
E
′AB γ
κ1 κ˜1
∣∣∣E′AB γκ2 κ˜2 〉 of Eve’s
possible states. We may write the matrix of all overlaps
as
S =
0+ 0− 1+ 1−



1 B A AB 0 +
B 1 AB A 0−
A AB 1 B 1 +
AB A B 1 1−
(49)
where we have ignored phase factors that may always
be removed by multiplying the states
∣∣∣E′AB γκ κ˜ 〉 by other
appropriate phase factors. The matrix of overlaps reveals
the inter-relationship between the basis vectors in Eve’s
total state. It can be seen that the matrix is expressible
in tensor product form as
S =
(
1 A
A 1
)
⊗
(
1 B
B 1
)
(50)
which implies that Eve’s state is the product of two states
in two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, which we write as∣∣∣E′AB γκ κ˜ 〉 = ∣∣E′AB γκ 〉 ∣∣∣E′AB γκ˜ 〉 . (51)
The individual states can be expanded as∣∣∣E′AB γ0 〉 = c0 |Φ0〉+ c1 |Φ1〉 (52)∣∣∣E′AB γ1 〉 = c0 |Φ0〉 − c1 |Φ1〉 (53)
and ∣∣∣E′AB γ+ 〉 = c+ |Φ+〉+ c− |Φ−〉 (54)∣∣∣E′AB γ− 〉 = c+ |Φ+〉 − c− |Φ−〉 . (55)
where {|Φ0〉 , |Φ1〉} and {|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉} are orthonormal
basis sets for the Hilbert spaces spanned by
∣∣E′AB γκ 〉 and∣∣∣E′AB γκ˜ 〉, respectively.
Our focus now turns to relating the coefficients to the
overlaps A and B. We perform the following inner prod-
ucts 〈
E
′AB γ
0
∣∣∣E′AB γ0 〉 = |c0|2 + |c1|2 = 1 (56)〈
E
′AB γ
0
∣∣∣E′AB γ1 〉 = |c0|2 − |c1|2 = A (57)
from which we obtain expressions for the absolute values
of the coefficients c0 and c1 of
|c0|2 = 1
2
(1 + A) (58)
and |c1|2 = 1
2
(1− A) , (59)
and following a similar calculation we arrive at the follow-
ing expressions for the absolute values of the remaining
coefficients
|c+|2 = 1
2
(1 +B) (60)
and |c−|2 = 1
2
(1−B) . (61)
7The values A and B are computed from the overlap for-
mula for Gaussian states [49], which, for two pure states
ρˆ1 and ρˆ2 with the same CM,V and different mean values
x¯1 and x¯2, reduces to
Tr(ρˆ1ρˆ2) = exp
[
−1
4
(x¯1 − x¯2)TV−1(x¯1 − x¯2)
]
(62)
and our coefficients A and B become
A =
〈
E
′AB γ
0
∣∣∣E′AB γ1 〉 = exp
[
−1
2
A
2
(
1− ητA
υ
)]
(63)
and
B =
〈
E
′AB γ
+
∣∣∣E′AB γ− 〉 = exp
[
−1
2
B
2
(
1− ητB
υ
)]
. (64)
We now have all of the tools required to compute Eve’s
total state using Eq. (48). We arrive at the following
matrix
Eˆ
′AB γ =


|c0|2|c+|2 |c0|2c+c∗−Λ(+,−,+,−) |c+|2c0c∗1Λ(+,+,−,−) c0c+c∗1c∗−Λ(+,−,−,+)
|c0|2c−c∗+Λ(+,−,+,−) |c0|2|c−|2 c0c−c∗1c∗+Λ(+,−,−,+) |c−|2c0c∗1Λ(+,+,−,−)
|c+|2c1c∗0Λ(+,+,−,−) c1c+c∗0c∗−Λ(+,−,−,+) |c1|2|c+|2 |c1|2c+c∗−Λ(+,−,+,−)
c1c−c
∗
0c
∗
+Λ(+,−,−,+) |c−|2c1c∗0Λ(+,+,−,−) |c1|2c0c∗+Λ(+,−,+,−) |c1|2|c−|2

 (65)
where we have defined
Λ(s1, s2, s3, s4) = s1p
AB γ
0+ + s2p
AB γ
0− + s3p
AB γ
1+ + s4p
AB γ
1− .
(66)
To obtain the entropy of the total state, we first compute
the eigenvalues of Eq. (65) which amounts to solving a
quartic equation in which the coefficients are combina-
tions of the absolute values of the basis coefficients. We
then compute their VNE using Eq. (40). This entropy is
then substituted into Eq. (41) to obtain the first term of
the Holevo bound.
In order to compute the conditional state and the sec-
ond term of the Holevo bound, we construct the density
matrices of the conditional states. Firstly, we have
Eˆ
′AB γ
0 =
∣∣∣E′AB γ0 〉〈E′AB γ0 ∣∣∣⊗
(
pAB γ+|0
∣∣∣E′AB γ+ 〉〈E′AB γ+ ∣∣∣
+ pAB γ−|0
∣∣∣E′AB γ− 〉〈E′AB γ− ∣∣∣
)
(67)
which has corresponding eigenvalues
λ01,2 =
1
2
(
1±
√
1− 16pAB γ+|0 pAB γ−|0 |c−|2|c+|2
)
. (68)
then, for the counterpart state we have
Eˆ
′AB γ
1 =
∣∣∣E′AB γ1 〉〈E′AB γ1 ∣∣∣⊗
(
pAB γ+|1
∣∣∣E′AB γ+ 〉〈E′AB γ+ ∣∣∣
+ pAB γ−|1
∣∣∣E′AB γ− 〉〈E′AB γ− ∣∣∣
)
(69)
with eigenvalues
λ11,2 =
1
2
(
1±
√
1− 16pAB γ+|1 pAB γ−|1 |c−|2|c+|2
)
. (70)
Using the eigenvalues of the two states, it is straightfor-
ward to compute the second term of the Holevo bound
using Eq. (43).
A. Restricted eavesdropping
Let us now consider Eve’s accessible information in the
restricted eavesdropping scenario. In this case, Eve has to
distinguish between two states corresponding to the two
possible values of κ. Under these conditions, it is possible
to consider both individual and collective attacks as we
will outline in the following sections.
1. Individual attacks
Let us first examine the case in which Eve employs
individual attacks, and may not access a quantum mem-
ory. In this case the mutual information between Alice
and Eve, IAE , can be estimated by from Eve’s error prob-
ability using the fidelity, F of Eve’s two possible states,
ρˆE′|+A γ and ρˆE′|−A γ which we compute using Eq. (62).
We apply the following lower bound
F− =
1−√1− F
2
(71)
in order to bound Eve’s error probability from below,
modeling a worst-case scenario for Alice and Bob [50].
The total expression for the mutual information IAB be-
comes
IAE =
∫
p(A γ) [1−H2(F−)] dA dγ. (72)
where H2(p) is the binary entropy.
2. Collective attacks
In the case of collective attacks we must compute the
Holevo bound in order to establish an upper-bound Eve’s
8accessible information. The Holevo bound is given by
χRE(E′ : κ|A γ) = S(E′|A γ)− S(E′|κA γ) (73)
where the first term can be written as
S(E′|A γ) =
∫
p(A γ)S(ρˆE′|A γ) dA d γ, (74)
where ρˆE′|A γ is the total state, given by
ρˆE′|A γ =
∑
κ
p(κ|A γ)ρˆE′|κA γ . (75)
As it is derived from the sum of two Gaussian states, the
total state is non-Gaussian. To avoid the difficulty in ob-
taining the entropy of this state from its photon statistics,
we may employ a non-Gaussian entropy approximation
which we derive in Appendix B. Using the main result
we may write the CM of the total state as
VE′|A = VE′|κA + p(+|A γ)p(−|A γ)∆x¯E′ ·∆x¯TE′ (76)
where ∆x¯E′ = x¯E′|+A γ − x¯E′|−A γ . Taking the entropy of
this state via the symplectic eigenvalues, {νi} of its CM
provides an upper bound on the exact entropy of Eve’s
total state as it assumes this state to be Gaussian. We
therefore have
S(ρˆκA γ) < S(VE′|κA γ) =
∑
i
h(νi) (77)
where
h(x) =
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
− x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
. (78)
Meanwhile, the second term of the Holevo bound in-
volves a Gaussian state and can be computed directly
from the protocol output, independent of any measure-
ment outcome. As described in Section ??, Eve’s CM
VE′|κA after the relay measurements is obtained by trac-
ing out Bob’s remaining mode. The entropy is then sim-
ply computed from the symplectic eigenvalues, {υi} of
the remaining CM by
S(ρˆE′|κA) = S(VE′|κA) =
∑
i
h(υi). (79)
The Holevo bound is then reduced to the following ex-
pression
χ(E′ : κ|A γ) ≤
∫
p(A γ)S(VE′|A γ) dA d γ
− S(VE′|κA γ). (80)
V. RAW KEY AND POST-SELECTION
We have now computed all of the components required
for the calculation of the secret key rate and we can now
describe the post-selection step that improves the range
of our protocol. Let us first write the mutual information
as a single integrand in the following form
IAB =
∫
p(AB γ)I˜AB(A,B, γ) dA dB d γ . (81)
where we defined the single-point mutual information
I˜AB(A,B, γ) = Hκ|AB γ−
∑
κ˜ p(κ˜ |AB γ)Hκ| κ˜AB γ . Simi-
larly, we can write the Holevo bound as a single integrand
χ =
∫
p(AB γ)χ˜(A,B, γ) dA dB dγ (82)
with χ˜ being the single-point Holevo bound given by
χ˜ = S(ρˆE′|AB γ)−
∑
κ
p(κ|AB γ)S(ρE′|κAB γ). (83)
In the same way, we define the following single-point
Holevo bound for restricted eavesdropping, χ˜RE for col-
lective attacks and the single-point mutual information
between Alice and Eve, I˜AE for individual attacks,
χRE ≤ S(VE′|A γ)− S(VE′|κA γ) (84)
I˜AE = 1−H2(F−). (85)
Using these definitions, we may define the single-point
rate, R˜ = I˜AB−χ˜ for complete eavesdropping, R˜ = I˜AB−
χ˜RE for restricted eavesdropping and R˜ = I˜AB − I˜AE for
individual attacks. We can then express the secret key
rate in terms of the single-point rate as
R =
∫
p(AB γ)R˜(A,B, γ) dA dB d γ . (86)
For post-selection, we are interested in the region
where the single-point rate is positive so that the parties
can choose to only include instances of the protocol that
contribute positively to the key rate. We can therefore
define the post-selected key rate as
RPS =
∫
p(AB γ)max{R˜(A,B, γ), 0} dA dB d γ . (87)
We can also define the post-selection area Γ, which is sim-
ply the region of the A-B-γ volume in which the single-
point rate is positive. Computing the post-selected rate
amounts to integrating the single-point rate in this vol-
ume,
RPS =
∫
Γ
p(AB γ)R˜(A,B, γ) dA dB d γ . (88)
VI. RESULTS
Let us now present numerical results for the rates of
our protocol under a variety of parameters. In order to
express the rates as a function of the distance between
the parties, we have first used the relation τ = 10−dB/10
to express the transmissivity in terms of the loss in dB.
9Then, if the protocol is performed with standard optical
fiber, the length of the links can be expressed in km us-
ing the relation 0.2 dB/km. We use the excess noise to
express the variances ωA and ωB in terms of the trans-
missivities of the channels. By considering each link to
be a point-to-point channel we write
ωA(B) = 1 + ǫA(B)
ητA(B)/2
1− ητA(B)/2
. (89)
where ǫA(B) is the excess noise in the Alice-relay (Bob-
relay) links.
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FIG. 3: Rates of the pure-loss symmetric protocol as a func-
tion of the total distance between Alice and Bob with σA,
σB and µ optimized. The red line represents the rate of the
symmetric Gaussian MDI protocol.
Fig. 3 shows the total-distance between Alice and Bob
as a function of the rates of all variations of the protocol
in the symmetric configuration (τA = τB) and assum-
ing a pure-loss attack (ǫ = ǫA = ǫB = 0) with perfect
detection efficiency. The rates are optimized over the
variances σA and σB (σA and µ for restricted eavesdrop-
ping). For comparison we include the rate of the original
Gaussian MDI protocol [32] with equivalent parameters.
At the cost of a lower rate at short distances, our protocol
improves the range at which the parties may communi-
cate. It is important to note that a fully secure rate in
which Bob broadcasts less information may lie anywhere
between the rates of the complete and restricted eaves-
dropping cases, but despite being the worst-case scenario,
the rate under complete eavesdropping offers a notable
advantage over the Gaussian MDI protocol.
Fig. 4 shows rates of protocol under complete eaves-
dropping as a function of the total distance between Alice
and Bob. We show the pure-loss rate with ideal param-
eters η = 1 and β = 1 as well as a realistic rate with
excess noise ǫ = 0.05, detector efficiency of 98% and rec-
onciliation efficiency of 95%. Again, we also show the
optimal rates of the Gaussian MDI protocol with identi-
cal parameters. Our protocol provides an advantage over
the original MDI protocol under ideal as well as realistic
parameters. In Fig. 5 we explore the asymmetric con-
figuration of the protocol under complete eavesdropping.
We see that our protocol offers the biggest advantage as
the symmetry of the configuration increases. However,
we still observe an advantage in the asymmetric regime
up to very asymmetric configurations with less than 1 km
separating Alice from the relay.
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FIG. 4: Rates of the symmetric protocol function of the total
distance between Alice and Bob with σA and σB optimized
(black lines). For comparison, we include the original Gaus-
sian MDI protocol with optimal parameters (red lines). The
solid lines correspond to the pure-loss protocols ideal param-
eters η = 1 and β = 1, while the dashed lines correspond to
a realistic scenario with ǫ = 0.05, η = 0.98 and β = 0.95.
To explore the effect of the realistic parameters in
more detail, we consider in Fig. 6, for individual and col-
lective attacks with restricted eavesdropping, the rates
with ǫ = 0.05, η = 0.8 and β = 0.95 (these are typical
choices [51]) in the symmetric configuration. For each
rate, we have incorporated η by scaling the transmissiv-
ities on each link. This has a considerable effect on the
rate but a distance exceeding 60km with collective at-
tacks is still possible. In appendix A, we consider the
optimal parameters σA and µ for an experimental con-
figuration.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have introduced a long-distance CV-
MDI-QKD protocol with a general mathematical formu-
lation with collective attacks which can include excess
noise and experimental inefficiencies. We have demon-
strated that our protocol exceeds the range of the origi-
nal Gaussian CV-MDI-QKD protocol in both symmetric
and asymmetric configurations. This improvement exists
in the strongest eavesdropping scenario and is substan-
tially increased to distances exceeding 50 km if restricted
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FIG. 5: Comparison of the maximum Bob-relay distance as
a function of the Alice-relay distance under the strongest at-
tack. The black lines represent our protocol with the solid
line corresponding to the pure-loss case with ideal parameters
η = 1 and β = 1. The dashed line corresponds to case with
ǫ = 0.05 and imperfect parameters η = 0.98 and β = 0.95.
For comparison, the red line represents a rate of the pure-loss
Gaussian MDI protocol with ideal parameters.
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FIG. 6: Rates of the symmetric protocol with restricted eaves-
dropping as a function of the total distance between Alice and
Bob with σA and µ optimized. The black lines correspond
to the pure-loss case with perfect detection and reconcilia-
tion while the red lines represent the rate with parameters
ǫ = 0.05, η = 0.8, and β = 0.95.
eavesdropping is considered with either individual or col-
lective attacks. In future work, it would be beneficial
to explore the possibility of a fully-secure rate between
these extremes if Bob is able to communicate all of the
necessary information to Alice without broadcasting the
absolute value of his measurement in each use of the pro-
tocol.
Our protocol is robust against excess noise as well as
detection and reconciliation inefficiencies and it is, there-
fore, a significant step towards a realistic experimental
implementation. We have demonstrated that CV-MDI
QKD need not be restricted to short-distances. In fact,
our protocol provides a theoretical foundation for MDI-
QKD at distances previously only achievable with dis-
crete variable protocols, achievable with inexpensive and
easily implementable equipment.
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Appendix A: Optimal parameters
For the purposes of a proof-of-concept experiment, we
show in Fig. 7 the optimal parameters for the symmetric
protocol with restricted eavesdropping under individual
(top) and collective (bottom) attacks with the same pa-
rameters as those used for the rates in Fig. 6 between 10
and 20 km. The optimal values of µ are displayed with
red lines while black lines correspond to optimal values
of σA. We note that the optimal parameters are small
relative to the original Gaussian MDI protocol in which
the optimal value of µ tends to infinity for perfect recon-
ciliation efficiency.
Appendix B: Entropy approximation of a
non-Gaussian state
To avoid complex treatment of non-Gaussian states in
the Fock basis, we now introduce an approximation for
the entropy of a particular type of non-Gaussian state
that is constructed from the average of two Gaussian
states with the same CM and different mean values x¯+
and x¯−. We will use the CM and mean values of the con-
stituent states to write a formula for the CM of the total
state, then, by calculating the entropy of this CM we ob-
tain an estimate of its entropy. Clearly, this approxima-
tion is most accurate for states with small higher-order
moments, but it is an upper bound as we have assumed
the state to be Gaussian. We can, therefore, tolerate
some inaccuracy as we know that the actual rate is equal
to or greater than the rate obtained with this approxi-
mation.
Let us write the total state of the system as
ρˆ =
∑
κ=±1
p(κ)ρˆκ. (B1)
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FIG. 7: Optimal parameters for the protocol with restricted
eavesdropping under individual attacks (top panel) and col-
lective attacks (bottom panel). The solid lines represent the
optimal parameters for the pure-loss case with ideal detec-
tion and the dashed lines represent the optimal parameters
for ǫ = 0.05, η = 0.8 and β = 0.95. The red lines are for µ
and the black lines are for σA.
We firstly recall the definitions of the mean value and
CM of a Gaussian state ρˆ. The mean value of an operator
xˆi for a state ρˆ is given by
x¯i = 〈xˆi〉 = Tr(xˆiρˆ) (B2)
and the covariance matrix of a state is given by
Vij =
1
2
〈{∆xˆi,∆xˆj}〉 = 1
2
Tr [{xˆi, xˆj}ρˆ]− x¯ix¯j . (B3)
Using Eq. (B3), we can express the elements of the CM
of one of the constituent states ρˆκ as
V κij + x¯
κ
i x¯
κ
j =
1
2
Tr [{xˆi, xˆj}ρˆκ] , (B4)
and we can also write the elements of the CM of the total
state ρˆ, V′ as
V ′ij =
1
2
Tr
[
{xˆi, xˆj}
(∑
κ
p(κ)ρˆκ
)]
− x¯ix¯j
=
∑
κ
p(κ)
1
2
Tr [{xˆi, xˆj}ρˆκ]− x¯ix¯j . (B5)
Then we can substitute in the expression on the right
hand side of Eq. (B4) to obtain
V ′ij =
∑
κ
p(κ)
(
V κij + x¯
κ
i x¯
κ
j
)− x¯ix¯j
= V +ij +
∑
κ
p(κ)x¯κi x¯
κ
j − x¯ix¯j (B6)
where we have used the requirement that the CMs of the
constituent states are independent of κ. Now by writing
the mean values as x¯i = Tr(xˆiρˆ) =
∑
κ p(κ)Tr(xˆiρˆk),
and substituting into Eq. (B6), we obtain
V ′ij = V
+
ij +
∑
κ=±1
p(κ)x¯κi x¯
κ
j −
∑
κ=±1
∑
κ′=±1
p(κ)p(κ′)x¯κi x¯
κ′
j
(B7)
and by factoring out one of the sums we obtain
V ′ij = V
+
ij +
∑
κ=±1
p(κ)
[
x¯κi x¯
κ
j −
∑
κ′=±1
p(κ′)x¯κi x¯
κ′
j
]
= V +ij +
∑
κ=±1
p(κ)
[
x¯κi x¯
κ
j − p(κ)x¯κi x¯κj − p(−κ)x¯κi x¯−κj
]
= V +ij +
∑
κ=±1
p(κ)p(−κ)x¯κi
(
x¯κj − x¯−κj
)
(B8)
where we have used 1 − p(κ) = p(−κ). Now note
that p(κ)p(−κ) = p(+)p(−) for both values of κ, and∑
κ x¯
κ
i (x¯
κ
j − x¯−κj ) = (x¯+j − x¯−j )
∑
κ κx¯
κ
i . Therefore we
obtain
V ′ij = V
+
ij + p(+)p(−)(x¯+j − x¯−j )
∑
κ
κx¯κi
= V +ij + p(+)p(−)(x¯+j − x¯−j )
(
x¯+i − x¯−i
)
(B9)
We can write this in compact outer product form as
V′ = V + p(+)p(−)∆x¯ ·∆x¯⊺ (B10)
where ∆x¯ = x¯+ − x¯−.
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